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Abstract
Donors, NGOs, and governments increasingly invest in campaigns to reduce con-
sumer demand for wildlife products in an attempt to prevent the decline of overex-
ploited and poached species. We provide a novel framework to aid these investment
decisions based on a demand reduction campaign's return on investment compared to
antipoaching law enforcement. A resulting decision rule shows that the relative eﬀec-
tiveness of demand reduction compared to increased enforcement depends entirely on
social and economic uncertainties rather than ecological ones. Illustrative case stud-
ies on bushmeat and ivory reveal that campaigning to reduce demand may be more
cost-eﬀective than antipoaching enforcement if demand reduction campaigns drive
modest price reductions. The outputs from this framework can link targeted monitor-
ing of wildlife product prices to management decisions that protect species threatened
by harvest and trade.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The illegal harvest of wildlife is one of the greatest threats
to biodiversity (Maxwell, Fuller, Brooks, & Watson, 2016).
The problem is so urgent that from 2010 to 2016, for-
eign governments and NGOs donated over 1.3 billion $US
toward antipoaching measures across Africa and Asia (World
Bank Group, 2016). This money has largely gone toward
law enforcement that targets poachers, smugglers, and dealers
(Challender, Harrop, & MacMillan, 2015). To this day, pro-
ponents of enforcement argue that an additional 600 million
$US/year, Africa-wide, antipoaching initiative could achieve
positive economic returns just from the value of increased
elephant populations alone (Gray & Gauntlett, 2017). How-
ever, alternative antipoaching interventions are increasingly
gaining donor and government support—ones that attempt to
indirectly curtail poaching by reducing consumer demand for
wildlife products (Sato & Hough, 2016; Veríssimo & Wan,
2018). From educational and advertising material (Chaves
et al., 2018; Veríssimo & Wan, 2018) to the public destruc-
tion of ivory and rhino horn (Biggs, Holden, Braczkowski,
& Possingham, 2016; Braczkowski et al., 2018), these actions
aim to stigmatize consumer purchases as part of multipronged
demand reduction campaigns. Despite organizations mov-
ing forward with these interventions, and scientists exploring
drivers of demand (Gao & Clark, 2014; Hanley, Sheremet,
Bozzola, & MacMillan, 2017; Olmedo et al., 2017), there has
yet to be any rigorous study on the eﬀectiveness of demand
reduction campaigns for securing populations of poached
species compared to enforcement.
Where there is little empirical information, dynamic
models linking species’ population dynamics to poacher and
consumer behavior can inform investment decisions between
demand reduction and other management interventions.
For example, consider two species, species one, for which
poaching is diﬃcult to police and species two, for which
enforcement is mostly absent, but would be eﬀective if it
could be deployed. For species one, a demand reduction
campaign may be the best investment because the alternative
investment is not very eﬀective, while species two might be
better protected by increasing antipoaching patrols. Models
allow us to quantify this logic to inform management deci-
sions. Although previous studies have used models to increase
the cost-eﬀectiveness of enforcement (Byers & Noonburg,
2007; Messer, 2010), we suggest applying cost-eﬀectiveness
thinking to aid demand reduction investments as well. As a
ﬁrst step, we should ask, “How eﬀective do demand reduction
eﬀorts have to be in order to generate a positive return on
investment compared to enforcement measures?”
We propose a simple decision framework to assess the
cost-eﬃcacy of demand reduction campaigns and increased
antipoaching enforcement for species threatened by illegal
harvest and trade (Figure 1). The output of our approach
is a threshold for demand reduction eﬃcacy that can aid
stakeholder-funding allocations toward the two strategies.
We illustrate the framework using a simple dynamic model,
widely used to study predation (Kot, 2003) and harvest
(Bjørndal & Conrad, 1987). We then apply the framework
and model to two case studies, African elephants threatened
by poaching for ivory (Wittemyer et al., 2014) and poaching
for bushmeat in Serengeti National Park, Tanzania (Knapp,
2012). For both examples, we assume poachers are proﬁt seek-
ing (Byers & Noonburg, 2007; Messer, 2010), despite the fact
that antipoaching compliance is complex, involving personal
norms, cognitive biases, community support of enforcement,
and other factors (Arias, 2015; Brown et al., 2018; Gezelius
& Hauck, 2011; Keane, Jones, Edwards-Jones, & Milner-
Gulland, 2008). Incorporating such complications, within our
framework, should be a priority for future research.
2 METHODS
Our framework requires a management objective and a model
to predict the eﬀects of demand reduction and increased
enforcement (Figure 1). We illustrate the framework with a
simple, well-studied model of population and poacher dynam-
ics and an objective of maximizing equilibrium population
density. In the model, population and poacher density, N and
E, respectively, change at rates
d𝑁
d𝑡
= 𝑟𝑁 (1 −𝑁∕𝑘) − 𝑞E𝑁 (1)
d𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛿 (𝑝𝑞𝐸𝑁 − c𝐸) , (2)
with intrinsic population growth rate (r), carrying capac-
ity (k), catchability of individuals by poachers (q), price
per poached individual received by poachers (p), and cost
of poaching per unit eﬀort (c). Equation (2) says poachers
increase eﬀort when poaching is proﬁtable and decrease eﬀort
when it is unproﬁtable, where 𝛿 controls how fast poach-
ers adjust eﬀort. It is a well-studied model with a stable
equilibrium population density of N = c/(pq) if c/(pq) < k.
If c/(pq) > k, poaching declines and population density
approaches carrying capacity. Note, equilibrium population
density is inversely proportional to the price poachers receive
and directly proportional to the cost of poaching. Therefore,
management interventions that aﬀect poaching costs, such as
antipoaching enforcement, have diﬀerent eﬀects on popula-
tion densities than actions that reduce price, such as demand
reduction campaigns.
The simplest way to model the expected cost of poach-
ers being caught is to assume antipoaching patrols encounter
poachers at a rate proportional to the product of patrol and
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F IGURE 1 Decision support framework for strategic investment in demand reduction campaigns and antipoaching enforcement interventions.
It requires a quantiﬁable objective related to securing poached populations (e.g., maximizing equilibrium population size, minimizing extinction risk,
etc.), and a model that predicts the population's response to management interventions in order to calculate return on investment. This generates a
decision rule to aid investment. Then, monitoring the eﬀects of the decision in a way that can elucidate causal mechanisms is required to reduce
uncertainty and revise (or validate) the model to improve future decision-making
poacher densities. This is reasonable because patrol handling
time, arresting poachers, is small compared to search time.
With this assumption, the cost of poaching c is cp + ccs, where
cp is the cost of poaching under no enforcement (e.g., alterna-
tive income lost) and cc is the expected cost of getting pun-
ished (the penalty multiplied by the rate of getting caught
and punished, per-unit antipoaching patrol density [s]). In the
case where an added enforcement investment is chosen, we
let s = s0 + sa, where s0 is status-quo patrol density and sa
is the additional patrol density from the investment. The cost
of both increased enforcement and a demand reduction cam-
paign are incorporated through sa. We assume a ﬁxed budget
equal to the cost of a demand reduction campaign. Then, we
let sa be the increased patrol density resulting from alterna-
tively spending that budget on enforcement.
Using the above, we derive a condition for selecting the
most cost-eﬀective management action, a demand reduction
campaign or increased enforcement. Here, we deﬁne “most
cost eﬀective” as the action that produces the highest equilib-
rium population density per dollar spent.
2.1 Case study 1: African elephant poaching
for ivory
We applied the framework to provide context for deterring
elephant-poaching. Table 1 summarizes the parameterization,
with details in the supplement. To parameterize, sa, we must
know the cost of a typical ivory demand reduction campaign,
which includes the cost of print, electronic, and social media
advertisements to target consumers globally. Unfortunately,
there is no publically available information on the typical
cost of such campaigns. Therefore, we consider two baseline
scenarios, 4 and 54 million $US investments. The World
Bank reported that between 2010–2016, foreign governments
and NGOs invested approximately 8 million $US annually
toward illegal wildlife trade “awareness and communication”
of African species (World Bank Group, 2016). Given the
ﬁnancial interest in conserving elephants (Biggs et al., 2017),
for the ﬁrst scenario, we assumed that half of this money went
toward ivory demand reduction. For the second scenario, we
used a 2014 US Center for Disease Control and Prevention
antismoking drive cost estimate for a 3-month, high-intensity,
television and billboard education campaign of 54 million
$US (McAfee, Davis, Alexander, Pechacek, & Bunnell,
2013).
2.2 Case study 2: Poaching for bushmeat in
Serengeti, Tanzania
We used data from bushmeat poacher surveys in the
Western Serengeti, which recorded self-reported poaching
frequency, arrest frequency, punishments, and alternative
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TABLE 1 Case study parameters
Parameter Description Value Assumptions and source(s)
𝑐p Poacher opportunity
cost ($US/day)
Bushmeat 0.7
Elephant 2.1
Bushmeat: Average daily Serengeti income (Knapp,
2012). Elephant: Rural sub-Saharan Africa average
(Lakner & Milanovic, 2016)
𝑐c Expected
punishment cost
($US /day/[patrol/
km2])
Bushmeat 28
Elephant 5,341*
Bushmeat: 39 $US ﬁne, 0.0007 capture
probability/poaching-day (at patrol density s0), 0.56
conviction probability (Knapp, 2012). Elephant: 2
years lost income from jail sentence, 0.35 discount rate
(Mastrobuoni & Rivers, 2016), average capture rate per
unit patrol density, Luangwa Valley (Leader-Williams
et al., 1990) and Serengeti (Hilborn et al., 2006), 0.86
conviction probability (Leader-Williams et al., 1990).
s0 Initial patrol density
(patrols/km2)
Bushmeat 0.0005
Elephant 0.00065
Bushmeat: Reports from the Serengeti (Hilborn et al.,
2006). Elephant: Average patrol density in Luangwa
Valley (Leader-Williams et al., 1990; Milner-gulland &
Leader-Williams, 1992) and Serengeti (Hilborn et al.,
2006)
sa Increased patrol
density from
budget
(patrols/km2)
Bushmeat 0.0001
Elephant 0.00002,
0.0003
150 $US/patrol-day, Selous-Game Reserve (see
supplement) Elephant: Budget of 4 & 54 million
$US/year and Elephant habitat of 3.3 million km2.
Bushmeat: 44,935 $US/year increased enforcement
budget, and 14,750 km2 Serengeti habitat.
*Note cc may appear high, but only because the units are per unit of patrol density. One patrol per km2 is very high. The expected punishment cost at a patrol density s0 is
s0 times cc, which is 3.5 $US/day.
income (Knapp, 2012) to estimate cc and cp. We then used
a demand reduction campaign cost of 44,935 $US, which was
the cost of a campaign to reduce wild meat consumption in
the town of Tapauá, Central Brazilian Amazon (Chaves et al.,
2018), including visual media, radio, print media, commu-
nity outreach and education, giveaways, coupons, and labor
(Chaves et al., 2018). See the supplement for the detailed item-
ized budget.
For both case studies, we performed a sensitivity analysis
to assess each parameter's importance for decision-making.
3 RESULTS
Given the model, a demand reduction campaign is more cost
eﬀective than increasing enforcement if the campaign can
reduce price by more than a critical threshold proportion (𝑝∗R)
given by
𝑝∗R =
𝑐C 𝑠a
𝑐C(𝑠0 + 𝑠a) + 𝑐p
. (3)
This says that the proportional reduction in price must be
greater than the proportional reduction in poacher costs that
would occur if an additional enforcement investment were
redirected toward a demand reduction campaign (see supple-
ment for derivation).
Some key insights are apparent from this formula. First,
it does not depend on any ecological parameters or the initial
wildlife product price. It is only dependent on socioeconomic
factors relating to the management interventions. Second,
for large values of the expected cost of getting caught and
punished (cc), the price reduction threshold is approximately
equal to sa/(s0 + sa). This means that the proportion of
total enforcement resulting from the increased investment
bounds the required threshold price reduction. Third, high
poacher opportunity cost favors demand reduction campaigns
compared to enforcement, because cp only appears in the
denominator. This means interventions that improve alter-
native livelihoods of poachers (Wright et al., 2016) work
more synergistically with demand reduction than increased
enforcement. Lastly, for small, initial, patrol densities,
increasing patrol density is more beneﬁcial. If patrol intensity
is already high, demand reduction is more likely to be cost
eﬀective than additional patrols. This is evident because s0 is
only in the denominator.
3.1 Case study 1: African elephant poaching
for ivory
In our baseline scenario, increasing the annual Africa-wide
budget for antipoaching patrols by 4 and 54 million $US
was as eﬀective as reducing ivory price by 2 and 22%,
respectively. Although there are major uncertainties in the
parameter values, the threshold is not sensitive to all of them
HOLDEN ET AL. 5 of 9
●●
●●
increased patrol density
●
(a)
$54 mil baseline
$4 mil baseline
initial patrol density
(b) $54 mil
$4 mil
opportunity cost
(c)
0.000 0.002 0.004
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
0.000 0.004 0.008 0.012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
0 10 20 30 40
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
0 40,000 80,000
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
punishment cost
(d)
Th
re
sh
ol
d 
pe
rc
en
t r
ed
uc
tio
n 
in
 iv
or
y 
pr
ic
e
F IGURE 2 Sensitivity of ivory price reduction
threshold to parameters: (a) increased patrol density (sa;
patrols/km2), from spending a demand reduction
campaign budget on patrols instead, (b) current patrol
density (s0; patrols/km2), (c) poacher opportunity cost
(cp; $US/day poaching), and (d) expected cost of getting
caught and punished, per patrol/km2 enforcement
density (cc). Circle/solid line and square/dashed line
represent the 4 and 54 $US million budget baselines
(Figure 2). The most important uncertainty for accurately
determining the price threshold is the increased patrol density
that would result from an investment equal to the demand
reduction campaign budget (Figure 2a). This is why a more
expensive demand reduction campaign of 54 $US million
must be more eﬀective than a 4 million $US one (compare
solid curves and circle to dashed curves and square in
Figure 2).
Other uncertainties had little eﬀect on the price reduction
threshold. For example, increasing the expected cost of getting
caught and punished, even by a factor of 10, only increases the
required price reduction to 35% (Figure 2d). This parameter is
the most uncertain in our baseline scenario because old peer-
reviewed studies do not incorporate improved patrol eﬃcacy
due to improvements in governance or technology (Nguyen
et al., 2016; Plumptre et al., 2014) and the value also does not
account for high variability in poacher penalties. Fortunately,
the price threshold is relatively unaﬀected by these knowledge
gaps.
The lack of sensitivity of the critical price reduction
threshold to patrol eﬃcacy (Figure 2d) is not the same as
saying patrol eﬃcacy is unimportant. Increasing patrol
eﬃcacy improves the eﬃcacy of new patrols and status-quo
patrols that would continue under a demand reduction cam-
paign. Therefore, the degree to which improved patrol quality
beneﬁts new patrols over demand reduction is dependent on
how many new patrols can be purchased relative to current
patrol density.
3.2 Case study 2: Poaching for bushmeat in
Serengeti, Tanzania
In the baseline parameterization, a hypothetical 44,935 $US
bushmeat demand reduction campaign in western Serengeti,
2006, would have had to reduce price by 0.2% to be more
eﬀective than investing the budget toward additional patrols.
Although there is some sensitivity of the estimate to param-
eter uncertainties, the price reduction threshold is always
below 10% (Figure 3). The threshold is much lower than for
ivory because the small budget cannot meaningfully increase
patrol density and because poaching punishments for bush-
meat are nearly 200 times less costly than for elephants. Like
ivory, the threshold is most sensitive to the costs of patrols
and the demand reduction campaign (Figure 3a). However,
unlike ivory, the threshold is sensitive to punishment costs
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F IGURE 3 Sensitivity of bushmeat price
reduction threshold to parameters: (a) increased patrol
density (sa), from spending a demand reduction
campaign budget on patrols instead, (b) current patrol
density (s0), (c) the direct opportunity cost of poaching
(cp), (d) expected cost of getting caught and punished,
per patrol/km2 enforcement density (cc). Circle is the
baseline parameterization, which produces a price
reduction threshold of 0.2%
(Figure 3d) and insensitive to the current patrol density
(Figure 3b), because bushmeat ﬁnes are low.
4 DISCUSSION
We introduced a general framework to aid strategic invest-
ment decisions between demand reduction campaigns and
antipoaching enforcement. Illustrating the framework with
a simple model, we found that demand reduction campaigns
are likely the better investment when managers receive small
budget increases and patrol eﬃcacy or poaching penalties are
low. A small increase in patrols, giving out minor penalties,
does not reduce the economic incentive to poach. In these
scenarios, if a demand reduction campaign could reduce price
by any amount, the campaign would be the best investment.
This situation is likely common for bushmeat hunting in
many areas of the world. However, for species that attract
multimillion dollar budgets, and for which poaching penalties
are high (e.g., rhinos and elephants), campaigns have to
reduce price by more meaningful percentages, roughly
1–40%, for the campaigns to be the better option.
Funding toward demand reduction campaigns has acceler-
ated over the past 5 years (Veríssimo&Wan, 2018), especially
for ivory, coinciding with a nearly 66% price decline since
2014 (Gao & Clark, 2014; Vigne & Martin, 2017). A 66%
price drop is considerably higher than the critical threshold in
our elephant case study. However, we cannot conclude cam-
paigns are more cost-eﬀective than increased antipoaching
enforcement, because the ivory price decline cannot causally
be attributed to campaigns, due to confounding factors (such
as trade bans and ﬁnancial crises). Therefore, it is essential
to supplement monitoring with controlled experiments
or techniques from causal inference (Baylis et al., 2016;
Veríssimo & Wan, 2018). For bushmeat, the eﬃcacy of
demand reduction campaigns has been mixed. In Tapauá,
Brazil, media and community engagement reduced demand
for wild, Amazonian meat (Chaves et al., 2018), but a radio
program in Tanzania did not generate statistically signiﬁcant
changes in self-reported bushmeat consumption (Veríssimo
& Wan, 2018). Our results suggest that even small, potentially
even statistically undetectable, responses to bushmeat demand
reduction campaigns would likely make campaigns more
eﬀective than using the same budget to increase antipoaching
patrols.
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Because the purpose of this paper was to introduce a
general framework, we used a simple model to maximize
generality, transparency, and clarity. For species and area-
speciﬁc policies, managers can use more complex models
agreed upon by stakeholders (Biggs et al., 2017). Additional
complexities worth exploring include market dynamics
(Fischer, 2004), consumers hoarding wildlife products as
speculative investments (Mason, Bulte, & Horan, 2012),
spatial heterogeneity (Bulte, Damania, Lindsey, & Lindsay,
2004), time-varying consumer incomes (Crookes & Blignaut,
2015), uncertainty and stochastic dynamics (Weitzman,
2002), and noneconomic values of poachers and consumers.
We assumed that demand reduction campaigns propor-
tionally reduce price by some ﬁxed amount. However, if
reliable transaction data were available, one could develop
detailed models of supply and demand, as commonly applied
to legally harvested resources (Burgess, Costello et al., 2017;
Frey, Chamberlain, & Prestemon, 2018; Fryxell et al., 2017).
Demand reduction could then be modelled as a demand curve
transformation. The unimportance of ecological parameters
for selecting between demand reduction and enforcement may
not hold in this formulation. When demand declines with
increasing price, ecological parameters aﬀect equilibrium
abundance (Burgess, Fredston-Hermann, Pinsky, Gaines, &
Tilman, 2017), but for poached species, uncertainties in
socioeconomic parameters are still much higher than ecolog-
ical ones, and therefore resolving economic uncertainty will
still likely be more important for management decisions. Most
importantly, it is diﬃcult for managers to monitor demand for
illegal products, and therefore the price reduction formulation
is likely more pragmatic without better data.
We used an equilibrium approach. However, transient pop-
ulation declines can occur in harvest models (Auger, Mchich,
Raïssi, &Kooi, 2010; Burgess, Costello et al., 2017; Conrad&
Lopes, 2017; Holden & McDonald-Madden, 2017; Ly, Auger,
& Balde, 2014). This is a valid concern for long lived, slow
growing species, where poaching and reproduction happen on
vastly diﬀerent time scales. In such cases, a manager could use
a time-dependent objective within our framework.
The biggest caveat is that our model assumes poachers
change eﬀort proportional to expected proﬁt. Proﬁt-motivated
poaching is a reasonable assumption in our case studies. For
example, 86% of bushmeat poachers in the Serengeti said
they were driven by proﬁt, while only 7% by cultural heritage
(Knapp, 2012). For other species and locations though,
noneconomic incentives may strongly inﬂuence poachers,
including social norms (Carter et al., 2017; St John, Edwards-
Jones, & Jones, 2010), personal food security (Damania,
Milner-Gulland, & Crookes, 2005), perceived legitimacy of
regulations (Kahler & Gore, 2012; Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998;
Rohe, Aswani, Schlüter, & Ferse, 2017; von Essen & Allen,
2017), and opportunistic encounters between harvesters
and individual organisms in space and time (Branch, Lobo,
& Purcell, 2013; Carter et al., 2017; Kurland et al., 2017;
Pires & Clarke, 2012). Even poachers solely motivated by
proﬁts operate with cognitive biases and limited sets of past
experiences (Keane et al., 2008). Like nearly all bioeconomic
models, our study does not incorporate these complica-
tions, and projecting the eﬀect of social and psychological
aspects of compliance on poached species is an open area of
research.
We assumed maintained yearly investments in enforcement
and demand reduction. While sustained investment is likely
required for eﬀective enforcement, it seems plausible that
demand reduction campaigns might only require diminish-
ing reinvestments to maintain the reduced price. Therefore,
our reported price reduction thresholds are likely conserva-
tive overestimates given the model.
Our model considers only two out of several potential
interventions. Other strategies include increasing enforce-
ment eﬃciency (Gholami et al., 2018), legalizing trade to
fund conservation (Smith, Biggs, St. John, ’t Sas-Rolfes,
& Barrington, 2015), and livelihood-focused interventions
for communities aﬀected by poaching (Wright et al., 2016).
A combination of these approaches, including demand
reduction campaigns and enforcement, might be beneﬁcial
(Salazar, Mills, & Veríssimo, 2018), but certain combina-
tions will pair better than others. For example, we showed
that improving alternative livelihoods of poachers works
more synergistically with demand reduction campaigns
than increased enforcement. These types of insights make
simple models powerful for aiding stakeholder dialogue and
strategically guiding antipoaching investments.
Overexploitation, poaching, and illegal wildlife trade are
issues of global concern that rally governments and conser-
vationists to action (World Bank Group, 2016). However,
knowing how best to respond requires an understanding of
the eﬀectiveness and costs of management interventions.
Otherwise, we risk spending scarce resources on ineﬀective
strategies and may fail to stem population declines. Our work
proposes a framework to aid investment decisions between
two key approaches associated with species protection,
demand reduction and antipoaching enforcement. Illustrating
the framework, we showed that demand reduction campaigns
oﬀer promise for the cost-eﬀective use of conservation
resources to protect threatened species.
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